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Introduction
For the past 30 years I have taught a course entitled " Logic.a l Theory," and here I should like to briefly relate its origin and history, desc ribe its structu re and content, and explain its aim and rationale. The course is at the uppe r~divisjon le ve l and has for prerequisite anyone of three introd uctory logic courses in (I) reasoning and criti cal thinking, (2) ev idence and inductive reasoning, or (3) formal, deductive, or symbolic logic. Its catalogue description reads: "General study of the nature of argument; how it relates to reasoning, critici sm, deduction, logical form, induction, and persuasion. Emphasizes both the systematic development of logical concepts and thei r application to actual arguments."
Thi s course originated in part as my attempt to teach a course similar (mutatis mutandis) to a graduate seminar I had taken in 1967 from Michael Scriven as a graduate student at the Un ive rsity of Cal ifornia-Berkeley, which was my first exposure to informal logic and critical think ing. That memorable course was enti-tied " Elementary Reasoning from an Advanced Standpoint" and described as follows in a class handout distributed on January 31", 1967 :
T he log ica l structure of actual arguments is still striking ly o bsc ure, a fact which is conceal ed behind the intern al precisio n, the intri cacy and the intrinsic interest of the various formal systems which have been spawned in th e attempt to clari fy that log ical structure. The class ica l fo rmal accounts, from the syllogism thro ugh extensional sententi al ca lculi to the systems S I-S6, are either noto rio usly or notably deficient, espec ially with respect to the (i) encoding procedure, (ii) th e id entificati on of assumptio ns and presuppositions, (iii) the ci rcularity of certain de finitions of th e connecti ves in term s of the stroke fun ction (or of numbers in terms of iterated quantifiers), (iv) the analysis of impli cation, (v) th e di stinction between deductive and inductive arguments and (v i) that between use and men tion, (v ii ) the " paradox of analy sis," (viii) the "Achill es and the tortoise" regress, Ox) the nature of argument by analogy and (x) of induction by simpl e enumeration, (x i) the analysis of "intern al" and "external" probability, (x ii) general statements, (x iii ) "class ical " and "criterial" definitions, (x iv) eval uati on, etc. This seminar wi ll examin e so me well -known proposed treatments of these d iffi culti es, in clud ing s ugges tio ns by phil oso ph ers s uch as Le wis , Reichenbach, Carnap , Strawso n, Ryle, Toulmin , Anderso n and Belnap . To prov ide a basis for such discuss ions, the seminar will be substantially concern ed with the "workshop" tas k of analyzing elementary arg uments with more than usu al care. This analys is will be used not onl y to eva luate th e suggesti ons ment io ned , but also to deve lop a more acc urate accou nt of reaso ning and a more effecti ve method of teach in g the skills in volved in it. Thi s will in volve so me study of relevant psycho log ical data, of innovative elementary texts, and of the relati on between psychology and logic. Prerequisite: the cap ac ity to id entify 80% of the topi cs and people menti oned or unu suall y high motivati on and reasoning capac ity. Texts: Tou lmin, Uses of Argument and Strawso n, Introduction to Logical Theory. The orig in o f my cour se also li es in my teac hing experience and in vol ve men t w ith c urri culum des ign and revision at my uni versity. When I was hired (as a specialist in logic and ph ilosophy of science), I was given the tas k of redesigning Ou r cou rse o fferings in thi s a rea. In regard to logic, I wanted to have a course w ith features s uc h as the fo llowing. It was to be advanced, at least in the minimal se nse of being a course to be taken aft er some introd uctory logic course, w h ich would be its prerequisite. It was to be ge neral in the sense of either including both deductive a nd inducti ve reasoning and log ic, o r o f transcend ing this d istinctio n. It was to be ori ented toward practice and app lication. And I did not see thi s o rientation as inco mpatib le with theory, bul ralher I thought sound theorizing had to be based on some domain or set of mate ria ls and data outs ide itself.
Furthermore, the co urse was to be required o f philosophy majors ( but open to nonmaj ors), and so it wo uld have to cover topi cs and approaches useful and impo rtant fro m a philoso ph ical po inl o f view ; he re [ had to ass um e so me metaphiloso phical conceptions. To make a long story short, let me say simpl y that I did not want to eq uate philosophy with technical routi nes and techn icaliti es (s uch as those that abou nd in mathe mati cal logic), nor wit h being prim aril y conc erned with what " ph ilosophers" say o r thi nk and how "they" reason.
A t first I used as textbooks the works o f To ulmi n or Stra wson used in Scriven 's course. I a lso tried such books as Richard B. Angell ' s Reasoning and Logic (New York: Appleton, 1964) , Robert Fogelin 's Understanding Arguments (New York: harcourt Brace Jovanovich, (978) , C.L. Hamblin Fallacies (London: Methuen, 1970) , and Wesley Salmon's Logic (Englewood C liffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall , 1963) . When Scriven's Reasoning came out, I found it more appropriate to use it in my introductory course on critical thinking, rather than in "Logical Theory." In any case, whatever textbooks I used, they had to be supplemented with other material in various ways, occasionall y discussions of concepts and principles. more frequently concrete and real istic examples of arguments. These examples tended to be different from those examined in introductory cou rses, which properly focus on everyday arguments dealing with current events and issues and fo und in newspapers and magazines. For the advanced course the examples were longer and more complex. I toyed with the idea of using arguments for and against the existence of God, as found either is a classic source like Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion or in a contemporary source such as Scri ven's Primary Philosophy (New York: McGraw-Hili , 1966, pp. 87-164) ; but I never did use them in this course. Instead I soon started using as examples the natural-language arguments for and against the motion of the earth that were intensely discussed during the Copernican Revolution, the best collection being Galileo's Di410gue on th e Two Chief World Systems. Parts of my book Cali/eo and the Art of Reasoning (Oordrech!: Reidel, 1980) reflect that early experi ence, and accordingly after this book was published I used parts of it along with other textbooks.
Event ually I settled o n the way I have been teac hing the course in the last several years. Now the course has three approximately equal parts. The first part is relati ve ly "theoretical"; in it we study Salmon 's Logic as a particular example of a logical th eory which corresponds in broad outline to the most common and trad itional approach. The second part is relatively "practical" and covers a spectrum of Galilea n arguments about the motion of the earth, using as a textbook my new abridged trans lation and guide entit led Calileo on the Wo rld Systems ( 1997) . Here the aim is partly to understand, anal yze, and eva luate such argumentation in any way that seems appropriate; partl y to apply as many of Salmon's co ncepts and principles as feas ible; and partl y to formulate add itional concepts and pri nc iple that mi ght constitute elements of an alternative. The third part of the co urse studies a relatively recent contribution to the theory of argument or logical theory as conceived here, and the work studied changes each time; th is part of the course also allows me to become better acquainted with recent work, even if I ha ve not done so in the con text of research and scho larship. Here I have used such books as Douglas Walton 's Inform al Logic (Cambridge, 1989) The class meets twice a week, for periods of 75 minutes each, and for a semester of fifteen weeks; the thirty class days are usually reduced to twenty-eight on account of holidays. The study questions are meant to tell students what to focus on when they study the reading assignments before class, but they are al so the subj ect matter of the lectures, and they also serve (either verbatim or in slightl y modified form) as examination questions. The questions whose numbers have an asterisk are relatively more difficult.
All que stions are keyed to the section or chapter number of the book to which they refer; the first numeral in the number of a ques tion denotes the section or chapter number. For example, question (5.5) in the Salmon list is the fifth of a grou p of five questions dealing with section 5 of Salmon 's book (assigned for day no. 2); question (3.6) in the "selections" part orthe Galileo list is the sixth of a group of six q uestions dealing with selection no. 3 in the Galileo book (assigned for day no. 17); q uestion (1.6.2) in the appendix part of the Galileo li st is the second of a groups of two questions dealing with Appendix 1.6 (assigned for day no. 19); and question (10.9) in the Eemeren list is the ninth of a group of nine questions dealing with chapter 9 of his book (assigned for day no. 2S). (2.1) What is the difference between an inference and an argument? (3 .1) Why is it that showing that a justification is inadequate does not show that the conclusion is false? (3.2) What is the distinction between the context of discovery and the context of justification?
(4.1) What is meant by (a) correct deductive argument, (b) correct inductive argument, (c) deductive argument, (d) inductive argument, and (e) fallacious argument? (4.2) What might be meant by (a) deductively correct argument, and (b) inductively correct argument? (*4.3) On p. 18 Salmon states that "'any inductive argument can be transformed into a deductive argument by the addition of one Of more premises"; in what sense is this true? Why is it true? Can you give an example (of an inductive argument, the premise(s) to be added , and the deductive argument into which it is transformed)? You might want to try to construct such example by using the proposition "the sun will rise tomorrow" as conclusion.
(5, I) What is meant by valid argument and by invalid argument? (5.2) What are the various truth-value combinations of premises and conclusion that are allowed and that are excluded for (a) valid and for (b) invalid arguments? (5.3) What is the one truth-value combination of premises and conclusion which is excluded in a valid argument? Why? (SA) What is meant by a subject term and by a predicate term? (13.2) What is the meaning attached to each type of categorical statement? (13.3) What are the logical connections among the four types of categorical statement with the same subject and same predicate: all S are P, no S are P, some S are P, and some S are not P? ( (6.1) One of the things Galileo does here is to advance a general conclusion about human knowledge, which may be called the principle of simplicity; (a) how would you state this Galilean principle of simplicity? (b) does Galileo give any reasons why we should accept this principle? (6.2) (a) Explain some of the reasons why Galileo claims that it is simpler to attribute the diurnal rotation to the earth rather than to the rest of the universe; (b) can you think of any way of criticizing this Galilean reasoning, perhaps along the lines mentioned by Simplicio on pp. [14g-49]? ('6. 3) The third argument presented by ) is interesting and important in its own right, independently of its connection with the rest of the passage; explain how this argument tries to show that it is more probable forthe earth than for the restofthe universe to have the diurnal rotation. (6.4) One of the things Galileo does here is to advance a conclusion about the physical world, which may be called the principle of the relativity of motion; (a) how would you state this Galilean principle? (b) how does hejustify or illustrate this principle? (g. I) In this selection Galileo stales and criticizes lhree distinct (though related) arguments against the earth's motion, and all three involve different aspects of vertical fall; (a) state the argument from actual vertical fall; (b) summarize and explain Galileo's criticism of the argument from actual vertical fall; (c) state the argument from apparent vertical fall; (d) summarize and explain Galileo's criticism of the argument from apparent vertical fall; (e) state the ship analogy argument; (I) summarize and explain Galileo's criticism of the ship analogy argument. (g.2) In this selection Galileo states and uses two important physical principles; (a) state the principle of the conservation of motion; (b) how does Galileo use this principle? (c) how does he justify it? (d) state the principle of the superposition of motion; (e) how does he use this principle? (I) how does he justify it? (g.3) Is Galileo advancing a methodological principle about the relationship between experimental observation and intellectual theorizing? Ifso, state the principle. How does he support or illustrate this principle? (*g.4) Galileo seems to use either Plato's doctrine of recollection or the Socratic method? How and where does this happen? What does Galileo believe about it?
(I 1.1) What conclusion is Galileo advancing aboutthe problem of how bost to define what it means to talk about the "center of the universe"? (I 1.2) (a) What conclusion is Galileo advancing about which body (sun or earth) is located at the center of the orbital revolutions of the planets? (b) Which bodies are being counted as planets in this context? (c) How does he justify this conclusion? (11.3) (a) What further conclusion does Galileo advance, in regard to whether the annual motion belongs to the sun or the earth (namely, whether the sun moves in an orbital revolution around the earth once a year, or vice versa); (b) how does Galileo use his earlier conclusion about which body is located at the center to support his further conclusion about whether the annual motion belongs to the sun or to the earth? (11.4) One traditional objection to the earth's annual motion was based on the apparent size of the planet Mars; (a) how did this objection try to disprove the earth's annual motion? (b) how did Galileo answer this objection? (11.5) Another traditional objection to the earth's annual motion was based on the appearance of the planet Venus; (a) how did this objection try to disprove the earth's annual motion? (b) how did Galileo answer this objection? (11.6) A third traditional objection to the earth's annual motion was based on the orbit of the moon; (a) how did this objection try to disprove the earth's annual motion? (b) how did Galileo answer this objection? (11.7) (a) What general conclusion does Galileo advance about the relationship between sense experience and reason? (b) How does he justify or illustrate this conclusion?
(15.1) (a) How do acceleration and retardation cause water to move with tidallike motions? (b) How does the combination of the earth's two motions cause a daily acceleration and retardation for each point on the earth, which gets the process of ocean tides started? (c) What are some of the fluid properties of water, which act as secondary causes of the tides? (d) What are some additional particular tidal phenomena, and how are they each explained? (15.2) (a) Analyze the basic structure of Galileo's tidal argument in support of the earth' s motion by discussing the sense in which the argument may be interpreted as being a causal, explanatory, and hypothetico-deductive argument; (b) analyze the intent of Galileo's argument by discussing whether or not he claims it to be conclusive (i.e., deductive or inductive), and if not, what degree of strength he claims it to have. (*15.3) Evaluate Galileo's tidal argument by presenting and discussing some objections which can be raised against it; for example, one could object that today we know that the tides are caused by the moon's gravitational attraction, and so Galileo' s geokinetic explanation of the tides is incorrect; how does this affect the logical correctness of Gal ilea's reasoning?
4B. Appendix
(1.1.1) What is the meaning of each of the following concepts, and how do they interrelate to one another: reasoning; reasoning indicators; arguments; propositions; conclusions, premises, reasons; arguing that, fOf, against, and from; objections; counterarguments; and perspective in argumentation.
( primacy of negative evaluation; conclusion refuting criticism; premise refuting criticism; premise undermining criticism; reason relevance criticism; disconnection; formal disconnection or deductive invalidity; explanatory disconnection; presuppositional disconnection; internal criticism; semantical disconnection; and persuasive disconnection. (*1.7 .1) Apply the various methods of analysis and of criticism discussed in Appendix 1.1 , 1.2, and 1.3 to the various arguments and counterarguments reconstructed in this section (1.7) of the Appendix.
(1.8.1) Discuss the meaning and interrelations ofthe following concepts: thinking, reasoning, critical reasoning. critical thinking, analysis, evaluation, and self·reflec-tion.
Study Questions about Fundamentals of Argumentation Theory
(I. I) Discuss the concepts of serial structure, linked reasons, and independent reasons by explaining the meaning of these terms and giving examples of each (pp. 16-19; see Galileo, pp. 31 1-13). (1.2) Discuss the aim of and relationships among logical theory, argumentation theory, and formal logic, especially in terms of the distinctions between the descriptive and the normative and between the empirical and the conceptual.
(6.1) Discuss the main concerns and problems of informal logic and how it relates to logical theory and argumentation theory. (6.2) Name the main scholars who have contributed to informal logic and briefly describe their contributions (book authored and idea advanced). (6.3) Discuss what critical thinking is and how it relates to informal logic and to logical theory by stating, comparing and contrasting, and evaluating several main views; besides discussing the views in van Eerneren, chapter 6, discuss Finocchiaro's conception of critical thinking and of its relationship to logical theory, found in Galileo, pp. 308-18, 326-27, 334-35, and 335-39. (6.4) Name the main scholars who have contributed to critical thinking and briefly describe their contributions. (*6.5) Discuss the distinction between the macrostructure and the microstructure (e.g., p. 176) of arguments by explaining what these terms mean and how their distinction and relationship might be used to interrelate formal and informal logic.
(7.1) Discuss the distinction between "conviction" and "persuasion" by explaining their meaning and differences according to some authors, and by evaluating whether the distinction is really sound (pp. 189-90). Aristotle's definition ofsyliagism may be regarded as a definition of a special kind of " logical correctness" which may be called "syllogistic correctness"; then the definition would read that an argument is "syllogistically correct" if and only if the several Aristotelian conditions apply. One issue is that one of the
